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REWRITING BEGINNINGS: THE LESSONS
OF GAUTREAUX
JANET KOVEN LEVIT*

We arrive at a historical juncture. A child of the sixties and
seventies, the structural injunction approaches maturity. As the
empirical results of structural reform efforts surface, we face a
unique opportunity to reassess the remedial process from beginning to end.
Can happy endings resuscitate murky beginnings? When the
Gautreaux litigation began in 1966, few believed that the courts
could remedy the seemingly intractable racial discrimination plaguing Chicago's public housing system. As remedial efforts faltered
throughout the 1970s, critics began to prey upon Gautreaux as a
prototypical example of the legal problems inherent in court-ordered structural reform. Today, in contrast, the policies Gautreaux
ultimately embraced are lauded nationally. The Gautreaux Program has effectively relocated over five thousand minority, lowincome families in integrated areas throughout the Chicago metropolitan area. These families are reaping unanticipated economic
and social benefits, including educational advancement and promising employment opportunities. While these policy successes are
impressive, they do not squarely redress the legal criticisms of
Gautreaux.
This Article will revisit Gautreaux's beginnings to discern
precisely how, if at all, happy endings can be harnessed to recast
its beginnings. This project assumes urgent significance as the
courts in Hartford' and Westchester counties2 craft remedies em* Law Clerk, Chief Judge Stephanie K. Seymour, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit. J.D. Yale Law School, 1994; M.A. Yale University, 1994; A.B.
Princeton University, 1990. This author is grateful to Professor Owen Fiss and
Professor George Priest for their guidance throughout the writing of this piece. A
special thank you to Kenneth J. Levit for his loving assistance from this Article's
inception to its publication.
1. In the case of Sheff v. O'Neill, a Connecticut Superior Court judge is expected to employ Gautreaux-type remedies to affect housing integration. See generally
George Judson, School Integration: Summing Up the Case; For the Plaintiffs: At
Issue, Lack of an Equal Education, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1993, 13CN at 14; George
Judson, Step by Step, the State Moves Toward Integration, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
1993, 13CN at 1.
2. As part of the settlement in a housing discrimination suit, a federal district
court judge approved a consent decree on September 28, 1993 which created a
Gautreaux-like program. Joseph Berger, Deal Reached in Westchester Housing Suit,
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ploying Gautreaux-type programs. To deflect challenges to their
legitimacy, these courts may refer to Gautreaux's successes. Although this tactic may prove effective, it obscures the precise
relationship between the legitimacy of the courts' remedial efforts
and the efficacy of the ensuing policy. In rigorously dissecting
Gautreaux's successes, this Article illustrates exactly how Gautreaux's endings bear on the legitimacy of its beginnings.
The courts employed a structural injunction to remedy Chicago's constitutionally unsound public housing policies. The structural injunction, which will be discussed in Part I, is the remedy
that most frequently results from public law litigation, where a
plaintiff class challenges a particular governmental policy. While
the structural injunction has been used in a variety of contexts,
including school desegregation, the environment, corrective justice, and housing desegregation, scholars question the legitimacy
of such judicial action and the efficacy of the resultant policies.
These critiques inevitably force the judge into the forefront of discussion, narrowly shaping the way in which the structural injunction is conceived by ignoring a host of inter-institutional relationships.
This Article proposes a vision of the structural injunction
that is more robust than that previously offered. Traditionally, the
structural injunction has been envisioned as a mere nexus between a judge and an institution implicated in some constitutional
violation. But the judge's substantive ambition, rectifying constitutional violations, also sets a group of institutions into play,
vying for power. Sometimes as an intended result, but more frequently as an unintended consequence, the judge's remedial efforts effect significant inter-institutional redistributions of power.
Using Gautreaux as a case study, Part II of this Article will revive
the inter-institutional dimension of the structural injunction.
Part II begins by sketching the institutional landscape of
housing policy in Chicago as it existed immediately prior to Gautreaux. Although aimed primarily at integrating public housing,
the Gautreaux remedy had the secondary effect of disrupting the
institutional status quo and catalyzing a redistributive process
that passed power from the Chicago City Council to the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA) to the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) and, finally, to the private sector. In
the end, the Gautreaux structural injunction forged a new institutional status quo.
In highlighting the inter-institutional and related temporal
dimensions, this Article shifts the structural injunction's image
from one that is unidimensional to one that is multidimensional,

N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at B1. See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
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from one that is static to one that is dynamic, and from one that
is judge-centered to one that is equally institution-centered. In
light of this reorientation, Part III will revisit the legitimacy and
efficacy critiques. Gautreaux'scritics frequently offered premature
conclusions that discounted inter-institutional dynamics. To comport with the structural injunction's multidimensional complexity,
each critique's temporal and peripheral frame of reference must
be expanded. This realignment helps alleviate legitimacy concerns
by emphasizing redistributive processes rather than particular
moments of judicial intervention. Once the efficacy critique is
recast, Gautreaux appears highly effective, forging a new institutional status quo that effectively sustained an innovative approach to public housing.
Efficacy and legitimacy are related. In providing a vantage
point from which to make legitimacy assessments, effective reconfiguration of the institutional status quo is a necessary precursor to any legitimacy inquiry. The policy successes that spurred
interest in this Article are legally relevant only to the extent that
they helped solidify the new institutional status quo. Even then,
such institutional reconfiguration merely provides the requisite
foundation from which the legitimacy inquiry can progress. While
happy endings may be an excuse to re-evaluate murky beginnings,
these endings do not dictate the outcome of such inquiries.

I. PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION, THE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION AND
LEGITIMACY
The Gautreaux saga is an example of "public law litigation."3
This section will briefly compare traditional litigation and public
law litigation, with particular emphasis on remedies. Scholars
frequently question the legitimacy and efficacy of the structural
injunction, and this section will also examine the substance of
these critiques. But these critiques are also significant for the way
they have framed the debate. In focusing on the judge's alleged
usurpation of legislative prerogative and the judge's competency
to effectuate such remedies, the debate has thrust the judge into
the forefront of discussion and discounted the importance of the
institutional backdrop.
A. Public Law Litigation versus Dispute Resolution
Public law litigation and dispute resolution are distinct models of adjudication. 4 While courts employ dispute resolution to

3. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976).
4. See id. at 1284; Owen M. Fiss, The Social and PoliticalFoundationsof Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR 121, 122 (1982) [hereinafter Social and Politi-
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vindicate private rights, public law litigation vindicates public,
constitutional rights. Public law litigation, therefore, becomes a
means by which to effect normative change.5 This stands in stark
contrast to traditional dispute resolution where the offending
party makes the victimized party whole without disrupting the
legal status quo.'
Dispute resolution involves two parties, a plaintiff and a
defendant while the judge plays the role of "umpire."7 The relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is adversarial,
and the judge remains isolated from the dispute. In public law
litigation, the party structure is not bipolar, but rather multipolar, with plaintiff classes defined by a common characteristic, such
as race, sex, or interaction with a particular governmental institution.8 Defendant public institutions replace individual defendants.' The trial judge plays an active role in the evolution of the
litigation, frequently intermingling with the very institutions
which are the sources of the alleged constitutional violation. For
example, the judge actively participates in fact-finding efforts and
even employs special masters, amici, or advisory councils to help
with this task."
Finally, the remedies differ dramatically. In traditional dispute resolution the remedy is retrospective and, therefore, is limited to the two individual parties. In public law litigation the remedy is prospective, commonly known as the structural injunction."
The structural injunction, as opposed to the traditional damages
award, is not confined to the parties involved but rather seeks to
avenge a constitutional violation by restructuring the public institution at the heart of the constitutional violation. 2 The structural injunction is usually negotiated between some or all of the
parties and the judge and, in this respect, also differs from the
judge-imposed remedy associated with more traditional forms of
adjudication. Finally, the structural injunction does not terminate
the lawsuit, as imposition of a damages award would. 3 The

cal Foundations].

5. Fiss, Social and Political Foundations,supra note 4, at 124.
6. Id.
7. See generally Donald L. Horowitz, The Judiciary: Umpire or Empire?, 6 LAW
& HUM. BEHAVIOR 129 (1982) [hereinafter Umpire or Empire?] (discussing the
functions that courts can reasonably be expected to perform).
8. Chayes, supra note 3, at 1302; Fiss, Social and Political Foundations,supra
note 4, at 122-23.
9. Fiss, Social and PoliticalFoundations,supra note 4, at 122-23.
10. Chayes, supra note 3, at 1297-98.
11. OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7 (1978); OWEN M. FISS &
DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 528 (2d ed. 1984).
12. Chayes, supra note 3, at 1302.
13. FIss & RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS, supra note 11, at 528; see generally FISS,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 11.
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structural injunction marks the beginning of a long relationship
between the judge and the implicated institutions-a relationship
that will last until reorganization of the institution is completed
in conformity with the structural decree.
B. The Structural Injunction's Critics
Scholars often critique the structural injunction in terms of
legitimacy and efficacy. These critiques respectively ask: Is the
judge exceeding her constitutionally prescribed role in ordering
the structural remedy? Can the judge effectuate the remedy she
chooses to impose? The following section will examine the substance of these critiques.
1. The Legitimacy Critique
Critics question the legitimacy of the structural injunction by
arguing: 1) the judge violates separation-of-powers principles; and
2) the judge employs countermajoritarian tactics.
The structural injunction frequently is viewed as an illegitimate judicial foray into legislative or executive terrain.14 According to these critics, the courts engage in legislative functions by
altering policy direction and setting budgetary requirements.
Professor Donald Horowitz contends that "[in the shaping of new
rules to govern a variety of institutional settings, courts have
been engaged in legislation without the benefit of a legislative
process." s Likewise, Professor Robert Nagel argues that the
courts have exercised "legislative functions by setting policy standards for the operation of federal programs, including the setting
of budgetary requirements."16 Courts encroach upon executive
functions in appointing officers that are directly accountable to
the judge, administering programs and/or bureaucracies, and
delineating detailed administrative procedures. Nagel contends

14. Chayes recognized that separation of powers principles would fuel the attack when he first articulated his model of public law litigation, noting that "[olne
response to the positive law model of litigation would be to condemn it as an intolerable hodge-podge of legislative, administrative, executive, and judicial functions
addressed to problems that are by their nature inappropriate for judicial resolution." Chayes, supra note 3, at 1304.

For the purposes of this Article, I assume that separation of powers can be
violated by the federal judiciary intruding on a state's legislative or administrative
domain. See Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equi-

table Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 673 (1978).
15. Horowitz, Umpire or Empire?, supra note 7, at 136; see also Donald L.
Horowitz, DecreeingOrganizationalChange: JudicialSupervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1289 [hereinafter Decreeing OrganizationalChange]

(discussing, particularly, the resource-oriented foray into the legislature's functions).
16. Nagel, supra note 14, at 662.
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that by "appointing executive and quasi-executive officers respon-

sible to the judiciary and by determining administrative processes
in elaborating detailed decrees," the judge has usurped executive
powers."
While these scholars believe the structural injunction illegiti-

mately empowers the judiciary at the expense of other branches of
government, they do not believe that the structural injunction is

inappropriate in all circumstances. A structural injunction used as
the remedy of last resort"s or promulgated with due deference to

the other branches" can be legitimate.
Scholars also argue that the structural injunction heightens
the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." 0 In exercising quintessentially legislative functions, the judiciary imposes the will of a few
judges on issues designed for majoritarian policymaking.2' In
other words, legislating via judicial decree is inherently anti-democratic. When the federal judiciary invades state or local legislative functions, this anti-democratic claim is often invoked to decry

the removal of decision-making power from "grass roots" levels-of
government.22

2. The Efficacy Critique
A prospective efficacy critique is often intertwined with questions of legitimacy. Efficacy critics believe the judge is ill-equipped

to effectuate a structural injunction, arguing that while the courts
may have certain comparative advantages, management of complex, institutional reform is not one of them.23 These critics argue

17. Id. at 662; see also Horowitz, Umpire or Empire?, supra note 7, at 137.
18. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 189 (1983).
19. Nagel, supra note 14, at 719. The degree of deference is measured by: the
depth of the intrusion into another branch's activities, the breadth of the intrusion,
the level of detail included in the structural decree, and the length of time over
which a particular decree governs. Id. at 720-21.
20. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed., Yale
Univ. Press, 1986) (1962).
21. See, e.g., Paul S. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 949, 958 (1978) ("[Institutional litigation] can be used essentially to
bypass majoritarian political controls .... What I am referring to here is the use of
litigation by parts of the majoritarian government in order to bypass the legislature or even the electorate").
22. Nagel argues, for example, that "[tihe substitution of government by the
federal judiciary for local self-government involves dangerous disproportionality; it
sacrifices fundamental democratic values in order to vindicate particular constitutional rights." Nagel, supra note 14, at 664.
23. Not surprisingly, these efficacy concerns have generated prescriptive scholarship aimed at maximizing the courts' effectiveness. See generally Robert E. Easton, Note, The Dual Role of the Structural Injunction, 99 YALE L.J. 1983 (1990);
Karla Grossenmacher, Note, Implementing Structural Injunctions: Getting a Remedy When Local Officials Resist, 80 GEO. L.J. 2227 (1992); Robert A. Katzmann,
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that the judiciary simply does not have the infrastructure, resources, or data-collecting capacity to craft remedies effectively,
only causing disappointment and frustration during implementation. Horowitz claims, "There is no reason to expect ... that the
least bureaucratized of the branches of government-and the most
accustomed to automatic unswerving obedience to orders-will be
particularly adept at management tasks."2' Other observers argue that "the courts are incapable of collecting and interpreting
the data needed to determine whether and how to alter the programs and processes of public bureaucracies."25 The courts can,
and do, employ the help of special masters, receivers, and advisory councils, but the effectiveness and efficiency of such auxiliaries
have also been the subject of dispute. 6 Others argue that the
judge, comfortable with dispute resolution, does not ask sufficiently broad questions in fashioning remedies and, therefore, imposes
an improper remedy: "[Blecause adjudication is concerned with
legal relationships-rights and obligations-judges generally overlook the feasibility of remedies and thus do not try to ascertain
how decisions will affect, or be affected by, the broader social and
political milieu."27 The efficacy critics focus on empirical outcomes and conclude that the results are sub-optimal.
C. Deflating the StructuralInjunction
The efficacy and legitimacy critiques mask an important
dimension of the structural injunction. In asking questions of
judicial propriety and judicial efficacy, the critics have forced the
judiciary into the forefront of scholarly debate, narrowly sculpting
the essence and meaning of the structural injunction. Horowitz
writes, for example, that the structural injunction demands that
governmental bodies "comport with standards announced in the
underlying judicial decisions."" Others have characterized struc-

Note, Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory: Changing Bureaucratic Be.
havior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513 (1980).
24. Horowitz, DecreeingOrganizationalChange, supra note 15, at 1304; see also
Horowitz, Umpire or Empire?, supra note 7, at 134 (claiming that structural injunctions "tend to tax the machinery of the courts up to, and frequently beyond, its
present limits").
25. Katzmann, supra note 23, at 514-15 (citing DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS
AND SOCIAL POLICY 48 (1977)).
26. See generally David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and Company: CourtAppointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L.
REV. 313 (1981) (discussing the legitimacy of utilizing the services of a master in
an institutional reform case).
27. Katzmann, supra note 23, at 515 (citing DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS
AND SOCIAL POLICY 34-35 (1977)); see also SCHUCK, supra note 18, at 185 (arguing
that courts will not think strategically about intrusive remedies).
28. Horowitz, Decreeing OrganizationalChange, supra note 15, at 1266-67 (em-
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tural litigation as that in which "[flederaljudges mandate basic
reordering of bureaucratic institutions."29 Even those scholars,
such as Professor Owen Fiss, who champion the structural injunction, view the remedy as "the formal medium through which the
judge directs the reconstruction of a bureaucratic organization.""
The judge-centered approach to the structural injunction, focusing
on the ability or propriety of the judge's actions, obscures an equally important inter-institutional dimension. As the following
discussion of Gautreaux will illustrate, the structural injunction
can and should be viewed through an institutional, as well as a
judicial, lens, focusing not only on the relationship between judge
and institution, but also on the relationship among the various
institutions themselves.
II. THE GAUTREAUX DECISION

By the early 1960s, public housing in Chicago was highly
segregated.3 The CHA's unyielding commitment to high-rise
public housing aggravated the concentration of minority residents.3" Despite frequently voiced opposition to such discriminatory practices throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the
CHA responded by expediting construction of high-rise units in
black neighborhoods.33 This prompted Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. to lead a march for open housing in Chicago during the summer of 1966. Such tension, set against the powerful backdrop of
Brown v. Board of Education,4 culminated in the Gautreaux litigation, filed in August, 1966.
In Gautreaux, a class of black applicants for and residents of
Chicago public housing, represented by named plaintiff Dorothy
Gautreaux, filed simultaneous 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 suits
against the CHA and HUD. The plaintiff class alleged that the
CHA violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964"5 by "intentionally" choosing sites "for the purpose of maintaining existing patterns of residential separation of

phasis added).
29. Robert A. Shapiro, Note, The Legislative Injunction: A Remedy for Unconstitutional Legislative Inaction, 99 YALE L.J. 231 (1989) (emphasis added).
30. Fiss, Social and PoliticalFoundations, supra note 4, at 121 (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Alexander Polikoff, Gautreaux and Institutional Litigation, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451, 452 (1988) (discussing the practice of the CHA of building
public housing in areas predominantly populated by African-Americans).
32. See generally DEVEREUX BOWLY, JR., THE POORHOUSE: SUBSIDIZED HOUSING
IN CHICAGO, 1895-1976 (1978); ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO:
RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960 (1983).

33. Polikoff, supra note 31, at 453.
34. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
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races."36 The plaintiff class further alleged that "in funding and
approving CHA's racially discriminatory programs," HUD violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964."7 The district court stayed all proceedings in the HUD case pending a final disposition of the companion CHA case.3"
In both suits, the court found the relevant housing agency
liable for discriminatory housing practices. Judge Austin found
that the CHA had deliberately chosen sites in a discriminatory
fashion, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,39 and that
"[nlo criterion other than race [could] plausibly explain" the location of CHA projects.40 Once he reopened the case, Judge Austin
dismissed the charges against HUD. The Seventh Circuit reversed
his decision, concluding that "HUD's knowing acquiescence in the
CHA's admitted[ly] discriminatory housing program" violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 4' While these decisions resolved questions of liability, the question of remedy remained.
The courts chose to employ a structural injunction. But the
judiciary's substantive efforts to redress constitutional wrongs also
dislodged the existing institutional status quo, forcing a redistribution of power and ultimately forging a new institutional status
quo.
A. Pre-Gautreaux InstitutionalStatus Quo
Pre-Gautreaux,when public housing policy was synonymous
with the notorious high rise projects, most power rested with local
governments. For the purposes of this Article, power means control over decision-making processes. Decision-making power can
be disaggregated into three general categories: policy decisions,
financing decisions, and implementation decisions. Housing policy
decisions, in turn, demand answers to the following questions:
Will housing be made available for low-income families? What
type of housing will be made available for low-income families?
Where will that housing be located? In what quantities will the

36. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 908 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
37. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 1971).
38. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 287 (1976); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448
F.2d at 733. Following the district court's decision to bifurcate the suit, this Article
will disaggregate Gautreaux into its CHA and HUD components. The "CHA remedy" will refer to the remedy in the CHA prong of the suit-the court-ordered scattered-site program. The "HUD remedy" will refer to the various market-based
policies, solidified in the consent decree, that came to be known as the Gautreaux
Demonstration Program.
39. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. at 914.
40. Id. at 912.
41. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d at 737.
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housing be made available? Financing decisions involve allocating
scarce resources to underwrite the cost of the policy decisions.
Implementation decisions concern the matching of those in need of
low-income housing with the low-income housing available, as
well as day-to-day administration of the public housing.
Before the Gautreaux suit, public housing authorities (PHAs)
and local legislative bodies controlled all policy and implementation decisions, while the federal government controlled financing
decisions. This institutional arrangement was explicitly sanctioned in the Housing Act of 1937: "It is the policy of the United
States to... vest in local public housing agencies the maximum
amount of responsibility in the administration of their housing
programs."42
Virtually unconstrained by federal statute, the CHA enjoyed
broad discretion over public housing policy. The CHA's power to
"prepare" and "carry out" housing projects,4" coupled with its
power to determine housing needs,"' provided the CHA with significant leeway to answer all the crucial policy questions. Before a
housing project could be built, the following had to be completed
at the CHA's initiative: 1) selection of sites and development of an
accompanying proposal; and 2) submission of sites and proposal to
the local legislature for approval. The CHA's site selection policies
were governed, in part, by HUD regulations, but these regulations
were relatively broad and served merely to limit rather than determine site selection.45 Once the CHA chose a particular site, it
compiled a housing project proposal." The ability to choose the
initial pool of potential sites gave the CHA significant discretion
over the location of public housing. Through crafting housing
project proposals, the CHA determined the size and nature of the
project and, therefore, the number of low-income families to be
served.
The CHA needed Chicago City Council (City Council) approval for all initial housing project proposals. An Illinois statute, in
compliance with federal guidelines,47 required that the municipal
42. Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1988).
43. Illinois Housing Authority Act, 310 ILCS 10/8.2 (1992).
44. 310 ILCS 10/8.1 (1992).
45. The site a PHA chooses must be adequate in size for the proposed project,
must comply with the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts, must be free from adverse
environmental conditions, etc. See 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (1994) for a complete list of
requirements.
46. Guidelines governing the content of proposals can be found at 24 C.F.R.
§ 941.404 (1994). A proposal must contain the following: 1) project description; 2)
site information; 3) cost estimates; 4) zoning information; 5) assessment of existing
and proposed facilities; 6) information concerning displacement of site occupants; 7)
financial feasibility statements; 8) copy of proposed contracts; and 9) project development schedule. Id.
47. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(e) (1988). This statute provides in relevant part:
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governing body approve all "acquisition of real property" or "interest in real property" before the CHA submitted a housing project
proposal to the federal government.48 The City Council, therefore,
enjoyed a veto over the CHA's housing policy decisions.

Most significantly, the CHA and the City Council determined
whether any public housing would be constructed. If the CHA did
not select sites, no housing construction would ensue. Likewise, if
the CHA did not submit sites to the City Council for approval, or
if the City Council did not approve the submitted sites, the housing project proposal would evaporate before reaching HUD.
Once the CHA developed a proposal and secured City Council
approval, it sent the proposal to HUD. HUD played the role of
financier and regulator, but did not have authority to substantively change the application.49 As regulator, HUD assured that the
proposal met certain environmental, 0 site,5 and design52
standards, as well as federal civil rights guidelines.5 3 As financier, HUD provided two types of funding, loans54 and assistance
payments, designed to make up the difference between the income
received from the project and the cost of running the project.5"

In recognition that there should be local determination of the need for lowincome housing to meet needs not being adequately met by private enterprise,
(1) the Secretary shall not make any contract with a public housing agency
for preliminary loans ... unless the governing body of the locality involved
has by resolution approved the application of the public housing agency...
(2) the Secretary shall not make any contract for loans or for annual contributions pursuant to this chapter unless the governing body has entered
into an agreement with the public housing agency providing for the local cooperation required by the Secretary.
Id.
48. 310 ILCS 10/9 (1992). The text of the statute reads:
[N]o real property or interest in real property shall be acquired in such municipality by the housing authority until such time as the housing authority
has advised the governing body of such municipality of the description of the
real property, or interest therein, proposed to be acquired, and the governing
body of the municipality has approved the acquisition thereof by the housing
authority.
Id.
49. HUD does not have the authority to change a proposal unilaterally. Of
course, HUD could reject the application, but, thereafter, the application would be
returned to the PHA for reworking. The new proposal would, of course, require
approval. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 941.405 (1994).
50. 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(e) & (j) (1994).
51. 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(a) (1994).
52. 24 C.F.R. § 941.203 (1994).
53. 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(b) (1994) (compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968).
54. HUD is authorized to make loans to the PHAs to "help finance or refinance
the development, acquisition, or operation of low-income housing projects by such
agencies." 42 U.S.C. § 1437b(a) (1988).
55. HUD delineates its annual contribution obligations in an Annual Contribu-
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Furthermore, provided that a PHA met certain preconditions and
complied with certain regulations," PHA bonds were granted
tax-exempt status. All PHA obligations carried the full faith and
credit of the United States government.5 7
When HUD approved funding for a project, the CHA reasserted control over major implementation decisions. The CHA, given
certain regulatory constraints,"6 was responsible for execution
and construction of the project.59 Once a housing project was
constructed, the CHA was charged with its operation and, most
importantly, tenant selection."0
Thus, immediately prior to the Gautreaux suit, the balance of
power among housing institutions rested decisively with local
government: 1) the City Council and the CHA shared policy-making power; 2) HUD held financial power; and 3) the CHA controlled implementation decisions. The following sections trace the
dislocation and reconfiguration of this institutional landscape.
B. CIA Remedy: Redistribution of Power from the Chicago City
Council to the CHA
The City Council exercised formal and informal veto power
over CHA site selection processes. Before formally submitting
sites for City Council approval, the CHA informally precleared
sites with respective aldermen."' Aldermen in predominantly
white districts would invariably "veto" project proposals, precluding formal submission to the City Council. 2 Those sites that survived this racially charged preclearance procedure were presented
to the City Council, which then enjoyed a formal, statutory veto.63 Remedial efforts initially focused on mitigating the pernicious effects of the City Council's veto power.
The courts first tried to break the aldermen's informal veto.
tions Contract (ACC) which guarantees payment. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(a) (1988). The

annual contribution cannot exceed the annual amount of principal and interest
payable on obligations issued by the public housing agency to finance the development or acquisition cost of the low-income project involved. Id. at § 1437(a)(1).
56. See 24 C.F.R. § 811.103-811.118 (1994).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1437i(a) (1988).
58. See 24 C.F.R. § 941.502 (1994) (project design and execution of contracts);
24 C.F.R. § 941.503 (1994) (construction requirements).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)-(x).

60. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(2) (1988) provides that a PHA shall select tenants. For
guidelines on tenant selection, see 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.201-960.409 (1994). Overall
income limits for eligible tenants are set by the federal government. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437a(b)(2) (1988) states that HUD shall set income ceilings. The PHAs determine specific ceilings based on median income levels. See 24 C.F.R. § 913.101913.110 (1994).
61. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
62. Id. at 914.
63. 310 ILCS 10/9 (1992).

1994]

The Lessons of Gautreaux

The district court, in grounding the CHA's liability, stated, "[B]y
incorporating as an automatic step in its site selection procedure a
practice which resulted in a racial veto before it performed its
statutory function of formally presenting the sites to the City
Council, CHA made those policies its own and deprived opponents
of those policies of the opportunity for public debate.6 4 As such,
the district court's order explicitly enjoined the CHA from "invidious discrimination on the basis of race in the conduct or operation
of its public housing system, including without limitation the
'preclearanceprocedure." 5 Furthermore, the district court bound

the members of the City Council to this order, thereby prohibiting
"invidious discrimination" by individual aldermen. 6
Most of the district court's order, however, contained specific
measures that limited discretion, making impractical the preclearance procedures. The order split the City of Chicago into Limited
Public Housing Areas, which had high concentrations of minorities, and General Public Housing Areas, which were relatively
integrated.6 Judge Austin demanded that the CHA immediately
construct 700 dwelling units in the General Public Housing Areas, 69 and that all subsequent construction be allocated between
the General and Limited Housing Areas in a ratio of at least three
units to one. 7' Furthermore, the judge ordered a scattering of
public housing by capping at 15% the percentage of CHA lowincome housing in any given census tract.1 Judge Austin also
placed size constraints on CHA public housing, limiting construction to a maximum of three stories.72 The stringent constraints of
the court-ordered scattered-site program gutted the informal veto.
Even if an alderman disapproved of the sites in blatant disregard
of the court order, the CHA would have been compelled to follow

64. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. at 914.
65. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 741 (N.D. Ill. 1969)

(emphasis added).
66. Id. at 741 ("This order shall be binding upon CHA ... the members of the
City Council of the City of Chicago").
67. Id. at 737. Limited Public Housing Areas lie "within census tracts of the
United States Bureau of the Census having 30% or more non-white population, or
within a distance of one mile from any point on the outer perimeter of any such
census tract."
68. Id. General Public Housing Areas include all areas that are not deemed
Limited Public Housing Areas.

69. Id. at 738.
70. Id. Due to CHA recalcitrance, see infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text,
the ratio was later changed; for every unit built in a Limited Public Housing Area,
the CHA had to build a unit in a General Housing Area. Leonard S. Rubinowitz,
Metropolitan Public Housing Desegregation Remedies: Chicago's PrivatizationPro.
gram, 12 N. ILL. L. REV. 589, 596 (1992); Polikoff, supra note 31, at 460.
71. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. at 739.
72. Id.
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the order and, concomitantly, to ignore the alderman's informal
veto.
Instead of complying with these guidelines, the CHA, relying
upon the City Council's statutory veto, did not seek project approval and, thereby, refused to provide any public housing, integrated or segregated. The mere existence of a local, mandatory
check on the CHA's policy decisions enabled the CHA to maintain
the City Council's de facto veto. To diminish the City Council's de
facto veto power, the court ordered the CHA to submit to the City
Council "sites appropriate for the construction in conformity with
the provisions of said Judgment Order of July 1, 1969 of not fewer
than 1500 dwelling units."7" In response to this order, the CHA
submitted 275 sites to the City Council. Of these sites, the City
Council held approval hearings on a mere 85, and eventually
approved only 50."
Given the City Council's impenetrable recalcitrance, Judge
Austin abrogated the statutory veto, declaring that the Illinois
statute requiring the City Council's approval "shall not be applicable to the Chicago Housing Authority's actions, including without
limitation the acquisition of real property in the City of Chicago."75 Instead, the CHA would directly receive public comments
on proposed sites7" and then decide, within the confines of court
orders, which sites were appropriate for inclusion in CHA proposals.77 In freeing the CHA of a crucial statutory constraint, the
court vested the policymaking power that the City Council previously held in the CHA.
In the first stage of Gautreaux's remedial process, the courts
redistributed power from the City Council to the CHA. The district court first forced circumvention of the aldermen's informal,
preclearance veto. Then, Judge Austin removed the statutory veto
from the City Council's arsenal. Finally, the court gave the CHA
authority, with due consideration of public comments, to decide
which sites would be submitted to HUD and eventually developed
for public housing.

73.

Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 436 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1970) (ap-

peal from district court order, arrived at after a series of informal conferences
between plaintiff and defendant, demanding that CHA submit sites to the City
Council by a specified date).
74. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F. Supp. 827, 831 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
75. Id. at 830.
76. Id. at 830, 831. Judge Austin also ordered the City to give the CHA "a list
of all the vacant, residentially zoned parcels of land in the General Public Housing
Area of the City of which it has knowledge." Id. at 830.
77. Id. at 830, 831.
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C. HUD Remedy: Redistributing Power from the CHA to HUD
Phase two of the structural injunction - the HUD remedy effected a significant redistribution of power in favor of HUD.
This redistribution stemmed from procedural, as well as substantive, decisions. First, in broadening the scope of the remedy to
include the entire Chicago metropolitan area, the court terminated the CHA's monopoly over Chicago housing policy. Second, in
relying upon a negotiated, party-driven consent decree, the CHA
was effectively removed from the remedial process. Third, the
content of the consent decree, emphasizing market-based, Section
8 policies, privileged HUD.
1. Metropolitan-Wide Remedy
By approving a metropolitan-wide remedy,"8 the courts began shifting power from the CHA to HUD. On a superficial level,
defining remedial scope was necessary to guide HUD's remedial
efforts. On a more subtle level, however, the courts' grappling
with a metropolitan-wide remedy should be understood as a struggle to decide whether the CHA should maintain monopoly control
over public housing in Chicago.
The metropolitan-wide remedy issue cannot be analyzed in
isolation but rather must be discussed in tandem with the
Milliken v. Bradley decisions," not only because they raise related issues but also because they were making their way through
the courts at roughly the same time. The key issue in Milliken
was whether the Detroit suburban school districts could be incorporated into a metropolitan-wide school desegregation plan. The
district court ordered a metropolitan-wide remedy.8 ° The Sixth
Circuit held, "IT]he only feasible desegregation plan involves the
crossing of the boundary lines between the Detroit School District
and adjacent or nearby school districts for the limited purpose of
providing an effective desegregation plan."" The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that a metropolitan-wide remedy that included
the suburban school districts would be unconstitutional.82
When the Gautreaux district court first examined this issue,
the Sixth Circuit had just sanctioned the metropolitan-wide reme78. Cook County contains, but is not limited to, the City of Chicago. The metropolitan-wide remedy involves the City of Chicago, the Chicago suburbs within Cook
County, and the suburbs in neighboring counties.
79. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974).
80. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. at 918.
81. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d at 249.
82. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 753.
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dy in Milliken. Nonetheless, the Gautreaux district court rejected
the metropolitan-wide remedy, stating that "[u]nlike education,
the right to adequate housing is not constitutionally guaranteed
and is a matter for the legislature."83 The Gautreaux district
court also concluded that, because the discriminatory conduct took
place within, and solely within, Chicago's city limits, it would be
illogical to include the suburbs in the remedy.84 Instead, the district court simply required HUD to use its "best efforts" to work
with the CHA to increase the supply of housing in a non-discriminatory manner.85
By the time the Seventh Circuit reviewed the metropolitanwide remedy in Gautreaux, the Supreme Court had determined
that the metropolitan-wide remedy in Milliken was unconstitutional.86 Despite this precedent, the Seventh Circuit rejected
Judge Austin's "best-efforts" approach and remanded Gautreaux
for "the adoption of a comprehensive metropolitan area plan that
will not only disestablish the segregated public housing system in
the City of Chicago... but will increase the supply of dwelling
units as rapidly as possible."87 The Seventh Circuit interpreted
Milliken as holding that the joining of suburban school districts to
effect a metropolitan-wide remedy would be "an impractical and
unreasonable over-response to a violation limited to one school
district."8 According to this interpretation, Milliken did not bar
all remedies extending beyond the municipality in which the constitutional violation took place but only such remedies which were
considered "over-responsive." The Seventh Circuit further reasoned that administrative and equitable distinctions between the
public housing system and the public school system made a metropolitan-wide remedy in Gautreaux practical and reasonable.89
Finally, the Seventh Circuit did find evidence of suburban discrimination resulting from an "extra-city impact" of "intra-city
discrimination."90
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's

83. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
84. Id. at 691. The court stated that:
the wrongs were committed within the limits of Chicago and solely against
residents of the City. It has never been alleged that the CHA and HUD discriminated or fostered racial discrimination in the suburbs and, given the
limits of the CHA's jurisdiction, such claims could never be proved against
the principal offender herein.

Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 753.
Gautreaux v. Romney, 503 F.2d 930, 939 (7th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 936.
Id.
Id. at 936-37, 939-40.
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decision, the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of
Milliken. The Court interpreted Milliken as hinging on judicial
restructuring of "the operation of local governmental entities that
were not implicated in any constitutional violation."9' The critical
difference between Milliken and Gautreaux, the Court believed,
was not the empirical distinctions between public school systems
and public housing systems but rather that HUD, a federal institution with a field of vision and mandate that extended beyond
the City of Chicago, bore partial responsibility for discriminatory
housing patterns in the City of Chicago.92 The Court further implied that restricting the remedy to the City of Chicago would be
irresponsibly ignoring the institutional expertise of HUD.93 Finally, the Court determined that a metropolitan-wide remedy
would not necessarily "interfere with local governments and suburban housing authorities that have not been implicated in HUD's
unconstitutional conduct."94
The CHA, already operating under stringent court guidelines,
also lost its monopoly over housing policy decisions in the City of
Chicago. By directing the district court to fashion a metropolitanwide remedy, the Supreme Court implicitly demanded that HUD
extend its range of vision beyond that of the CHA, breaking the
congruity between the Chicago public housing system and the
CHA.95 According to the Court, the Chicago public housing system also included the suburbs and involved a network of smaller
housing authorities.9 6 The only institution with vision that exceeded any one housing authority jurisdiction was HUD. Therefore, it would be incumbent on HUD to insert itself not only into
financing decisions but also into policy decisions.
2. The Consent Decree: ProceduralDecisions
A consent decree is a remedy negotiated by the parties and
approved by the judge.97 The way the parties negotiated the Gautreaux consent decree effected a significant redistribution of power
in favor of HUD. The plaintiff class and HUD, who until 1976 had
been aggressive opponents, approached the negotiated remedy
tentatively.9 First entering into a Letter of Understanding9

91. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 296 (1976).

92. Id. at 297.
93. Id. at 299-300.

94. Id. at 300.
95. Id. at 306.
96. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 304-06.
97. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The Approval and Interpretationof Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 579.
98. Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 612 n.87.
99. The Letter of Understanding was tantamount to a letter of intent developed
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and then solidifying their remedial vision in a formal consent decree,' 00 the plaintiff class and HUD, along with a representative
from the Leadership Council for the Metropolitan Open Communities (Leadership Council), forged a novel approach to public housing policy.
The CHA's exclusion from the negotiation process is striking.
While it is unclear exactly why the CHA was excluded, there are
several plausible explanations. The Gautreaux litigation had been
bifurcated into separate CHA and HUD suits.'' Just as each
institution's liability was assessed individually, so might the specific remedy be crafted independently. But given that the CHA, up
to this point, had played an integral role in the provision of lowincome housing, it is improbable that an artificial judicial bifurcation would preclude the CHA from participation in a remedy that
could potentially change the face of public housing in Chicago.
There are two additional institution-based explanations. The
CHA had been given a test and failed. From 1972, when the City
Council's veto power was abrogated, to 1976, when consent decree
negotiations began, the CHA continued to stall and defy court
orders. Racially motivated opposition to the scattered-site program
from within the CHA thwarted construction of all public housing
in that period. °2 Such behavior forced the plaintiff class to repeatedly seek redress in court.' 3 Instead of factoring CHA recalcitrance into a remedy, HUD, the plaintiff class, and the judge
may have deliberately tried to circumvent this formidable barrier
to successful reform.
Another explanation assumes more self-interested motives on
the part of HUD. Seizing an opportunity to augment its powerbase, HUD consciously opted for a consent decree as a means to
freeze the CHA from the remedy. This explanation envisions HUD
and the CHA embroiled in a power struggle, with HUD strategi-

by HUD and the plaintiff class. Agreement Between Plaintiffsand HUD Concerning
Implementation of the Gautreaux Supreme Court Decision, Hous. & Dev. Rep.
(BNA), 4 Current Developments, at 40 (June 14, 1976) [hereinafter Letter of Understanding]. It contained their remedial vision and was the precursor to the ultimate consent decree. Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 612-13.
100. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 668-69 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
101. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
102. Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 596.
103. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 384 F. Supp. 37, 38 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (appointing a special master to oversee the CHA's scattered-site program because "[flor the past five years and four months, no public housing construction has
been completed" and the CHA has "avoided and frustrated" the "effect and import"
of the court's orders).
In the face of continuing recalcitrance, the plaintiff class petitioned twice to
have the CHA placed in receivership. See Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 498 F. Supp.
1072, 1074 (N.D. Ill 1980); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., CA No. 66 C1459
(N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 13, 1984); see also infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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cally leveraging an opportune moment. There is a slightly more
benign version of this scenario. The CHA's policies had dragged
HUD into the racial intricacies of Chicago politics, ultimately
resulting in HUD's implication in this racially charged suit. Excluding the CHA from the remedy was the only way for HUD to
free itself from the influence of this tainted institution.
The CHA's exclusion from the negotiations clearly empowered
HUD. The courts and the plaintiffs had "given up" on the CHA
and instead viewed HUD as their hope for integrating public
housing. Moreover, HUD, in steering the remedial process, controlled the remedy's substance. In 1979, for example, HUD released a report assessing the incipient Gautreaux Demonstration
Program that emerged from the Letter of Understanding and
setting forth recommendations, backed with empirical evidence,
for the future of this program."' The report's conclusions were
later codified in the formal consent decree.
3. The Consent Decree: Substantive Decisions
The content of the consent decree reinforced the redistribution of power in favor of HUD. In linking Section 8 programs to
the creation of a constitutionally sound, discrimination-free public
housing system, the consent decree forced acceptance of the government's subsidizing role and, thereby, reshuffled power in favor
of HUD."°5
The consent decree employed Section 8 mechanisms to facilitate relocation of members of the Gautreaux class throughout the
entire Chicago metropolitan area. First, the consent decree enlarged the applicable General Public Housing Areas and Limited
Public Housing Areas' to include the entire Chicago Standard

104. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., GAUTREAUX HOUSING DEMONSTRATION: AN EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACT ON PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLDS (1979)

[hereinafter HUD REPORT].
105. The federal government's current market-based subsidization programs are
contained in Section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. 88
Stat. 633, P.L. 93-383 (1974). In Section 8 programs, the government makes "assistance payments" to private owners to cover the gap between rent and what low
income families can afford. The two currently active Section 8 programs are the
Rental Voucher Program and the Rental Certificate Program. In general, HUD
enters into a contract with a public housing authority, which, in turn, distributes
vouchers or certificates to low-income families. Under the Rental Certificate Program (or the Existing Housing Program), 42 U.S.C. § 1437fRb) (1988), assistance
payments make up the difference between what low-income households can afford
and the approved rent for an adequate housing unit. The Rental Voucher Program
is more flexible. Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, 97 Stat. 1153,
Pub. L. No. 98-181 (1983) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) (1988)). Although the
rental unit must meet HUD quality standards, the holder of a voucher does not
face the rent restrictions of a certificate holder.
106. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Ill.
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Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). 117 Second, the decree introduced the concept of a Revitalizing Area which included areas
in the City of Chicago which had "substantial minority occupancy"
and were "undergoing substantial physical development." "° Although the Revitalizing Areas were predominantly minority, the
fact that they were being developed presumably indicated that
they would become integrated sometime in the future. Third,
HUD promised to provide assisted housing in the General or Revitalizing Areas to 7,100 members of the plaintiff class. 9 Fourth,
"assisted housing" was to be provided primarily in the form of
Section 8 Existing Housing (certificates)," 0 with a subsidiary
role for Section 8 New Construction."' Specifically, HUD agreed,
on a yearly basis, to "set-aside" a minimum of 150 certificates for
the Gautreaux Demonstration Program.12 HUD also imposed
set-aside requirements on all HUD-assisted housing developments, but, to avert racial concentration, HUD limited the setaside to 12% of the units."' The district court also retained jurisdiction "for the purpose of enabling the plaintiffs and HUD to
apply to the court at any time for such further orders as may be
necessary or appropriate for the construction, implementation,
modification or enforcement of this consent decree.""' In sum,
this consent decree required HUD to relocate, in General or Revitalizing Housing Areas throughout the entire Chicago SMSA
7,100 members of the Gautreaux class using Section 8 mecha-

1969); see also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
107. The Chicago SMSA includes the City of Chicago, the remainder of Cook
County, and five other suburban counties.
108. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 674.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 675-76.
111. Id. at 677. The Section 8 Voucher and Certificate programs are currently active, but the government has experimented with other subsidization programs.
U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV. PROGRAMS OF HUD 75 (1992) (listing various
Section 8 programs). Section 8 New Construction was operated much the same way
as housing projects except that HUD financed private developers rather than public housing authorities. JOHN C. WEICHER, HOUSING: FEDERAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 65-66 (1980). Rubinowitz argues that Section 8 New Construction took a
subsidiary role in the Gautreaux Program because 1) the frustrating experience
with the scattered-site program in the CHA remedy; and 2) the Supreme Court, in
Gautreaux, emphasized the myriad of local regulatory barriers involved when the
government supplies housing. Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 618.
112. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 676. These "set-asides" are in addition to the "fair share" of contract authority which otherwise would be allocated to
the Chicago SMSA. Id.
113. Id. at 677.
114. Id. at 681. Currently, plaintiffs, HUD, and the Leadership Council meet
every three months with the judge to discuss progress. Interview with Katherine
Burtschi, Litigation Department, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 19, 1993) [hereinafter Burtschi Interview].
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nisms.
By embracing market-based public housing policies, HUD
recaptured significant policymaking power. When the government
supplies public housing, the local governments control policy decisions and implementation decisions, while the federal government
controls financing decisions."' On the other hand, when the government subsidizes in the form of vouchers or certificates, the
balance of power lies decisively with the federal government.
Disaggregation of decision-making power into its three constituent parts-policy, financing, and implementation-helps illustrate this shift in power. Some policy issues, namely the "what
type" and "where" questions, fall outside the purview of government control, federal or state, when Section 8 programs are involved. The market decides these questions. However, the federal
government, through the budgeting process, decides whether or
not to subsidize and in what quantity. Once HUD receives budgetary authority," 6 HUD contracts with various housing authorities to distribute certificates, vouchers, or other types of Section 8
assistance."7
Notably, a shift to subsidization denies local government, the
PHAs and the local legislative bodies, control over policy decisions. The federal government generally solicits the help of PHAs
to assist in the distribution of Section 8 vouchers and certificates.
Not all PHAs receive Section 8 instruments for distribution; they
must apply to HUD and be granted an annual contributions contract before receiving authorization to disseminate vouchers or
certificates. Although the Section 8 application process is reminiscent of the one PHAs utilize to procure approval for housing project proposals," 8 it is substantively distinct because it does not
reflect creativity and policy initiative. The application process is
rather routine,"' focusing on the administrative competence of
the PHA."' Furthermore, HUD's approval of an application depends primarily on a geographic area's Section 8 needs rather
than on the particular merits of an application. 2 '
The fact that the federal government pays PHAs various fees
for administering Section 8 programs is indicative of the purely
administrative relationship between HUD and the PHA. These

115. See supra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (1988).

117. 42 U.S.C. § 1437fb), (o)(5) (1988).
118. For an explanation of the PHA application process, see supra notes 45, 4953 and accompanying text.
119. For a description of the application process, see 24 C.F.R. § 887.55(b), (c)
(1994).
120. Id.; see also 24 C.F.R. § 887.61 (1994) (describing the administrative plan).
121. 24 C.F.R. § 887.63(b) (1994) (HUD's application review preferences for
voucher program).
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"administrative fees," as provided for both in federal statutes and
regulations,122 also reflect the hierarchical relationship favoring
HUD. Just as the PHA hires and pays a contractor to build a
housing project when the government supplies housing, HUD
hires and contracts with the PHA to carry out its programs when
the government subsidizes. No one would argue that the contractors possess any significant, policymaking power; likewise, it is
difficult to argue here that the PHAs possess any significant,
policymaking power in administering the Section 8 programs.
Furthermore, while local governments possess an essential
legislative veto over housing project proposals, no such veto is
available before PHAs submit Section 8 applications. 23 This contrast reflects a deliberate removal of decision-making power from
local governmental entities. If one assumes that legislative approval is necessary to ratify the PHA's policy decisions, removal of
local legislatures from the Section 8 application process suggests
that the application is not deemed one of true policy import.
Once annual contribution contracts are approved and allocated, PHAs generally reassert a certain amount of control over implementation decisions. For example, the PHA's responsibilities in
administering the certificate program include: publication of information, public invitation to owners, receipt and review of applications for certificates, issuance of certificates, and notification of
families deemed ineligible.'24 These responsibilities are circumscribed, however, by HUD eligibility guidelines, 2 ' leaving the
PHA with little more than rote administrative power. And the
administrative power that a PHA retains is significantly less
comprehensive than that enjoyed when housing construction is involved. Because of the nature of Section 8 programs, tenant selec2 ' are the responsibility
tion and maintenance
of private owners
27
rather than a PHA.1

Furthermore, Section 8 programs provide HUD with the
means to completely disempower the PHA. Whereas the PHA is
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(q) (1988) (administrative fees for certificate and housing
voucher programs); 24 C.F.R. § 887.103 (1994) (administrative fees paid to PHA).
123. The Illinois statute only requires local legislative approval when real property is being acquired. 310 ILCS 10/9 (1992). The relevant federal statutes require
local legislative approval only when the government is acting as supplier. 42
U.S.C. § 1437c(e) (1988).
124. 24 C.F.R. § 882.116 (1993).
125. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c) (describing formula for deriving maximum
rent charges); 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(1), (2) (describing formula for deriving rental payments).

126. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f0d)(1)-(3) (1988).
127. The federal government promulgates regulations regarding tenant selection,
24 C.F.R. § 882.209 (1993) (certificate); 24 C.F.R. §§ 887.151, 887.155, 887.157
(voucher), and housing quality, which private landlords must meet in order to
maintain eligibility to redeem vouchers and certificates.
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an indispensable part of government supply efforts, the PHA is a
dispensable part of subsidization efforts. In the certificate program, for example, HUD is authorized to implement the program
without the assistance of a PHA. 2 ' Likewise, HUD is authorized
to enter into contracts with private or non-profit groups to implement Section 8 programs. For administrative convenience and
simplicity, HUD usually prefers to delegate administrative functions to a PHA. But a PHA's services are not deemed crucial to
the functioning of the Section 8 programs, suggesting that the
PHA is the locus of few, if any significant decisions.
The derivative effect of the Gautreaux consent decree, therefore, was a reconfiguration and reordering of the government
institutions involved in public housing, with HUD emerging dominant. Pre-Gautreaux,local government enjoyed significant control
over policy and implementation decisions. The Gautreaux remedy
removed policy initiative from the CHA, leaving this local agency
with mere administrative power. Implementation of the consent
decree and institutionalization of the remedy deprived the CHA of
even this limited power.
D. Empowering a Private,Non-Profit Organization:The
Leadership Council
One of the distinctive features of Section 8 programs is that
they can exist independent of PHAs. HUD availed itself of this
option. In the original Letter of Understanding, which initiated a
one-year pilot program, HUD agreed to contract with the Leadership Council for the distribution of the Section 8 certificates.'29
When the Gautreaux Demonstration Program (Gautreaux Program) ' ° was formally solidified in the consent decree, the Leadership Council was again explicitly delegated all implementation
responsibilities: "No contract shall be entered into with an entity
other than the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities."'
But the Leadership Council was not a mere surrogate for a
PHA. While a PHA plays a mere administrative role in Section 8
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (1988) ("In areas where no public housing agency has
been organized or where the Secretary determines that a public housing agency is
unable to implement the provisions of this section, the Secretary is authorized to

enter into such contracts and to perform the other functions assigned to a public
housing agency by this section."); see also 24 C.F.R. § 882.121(b) (describing the circumstances in which HUD may implement the program without a PHA).
129. Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 612-13.
130. The Gautreaux Demonstration Program is the name that has been given to
the set of policies conceived of in the Letter of Understanding, see supra note 99
and accompanying text, and solidified in the consent decree, see supra notes 10514 and accompanying text.
131. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 675 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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programs, the Leadership Council was given a voice in policy
decisions. As a party to the negotiations leading to the Letter of
Understanding and the subsequent consent decree, the Leadership
Council actively crafted a vibrant alternative to public housing
construction,'32 Furthermore, the particular expertise of this private, not-for-profit organization was deemed crucial to the Gautreaux Program's success. A child of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
open housing movement, the Leadership Council had struggled to
eradicate housing discrimination throughout the Chicago metropolitan area since 1966.1" 3 The Leadership Council uniquely
combined social counseling and education with formal legal mechanisms to remedy housing discrimination. The parties recognized
that this "knowledge of the Chicago area real estate market" and
"experience in counseling and placement" made the Leadership
Council an indispensable pillar of the Gautreaux Program.'
The Leadership Council has leveraged this position, emerging
as the dominant member of a new institutional status quo govern:
ing public housing in Chicago. In carrying out its duties, the
Leadership Council identifies landlords in the General or Revitalizing Housing Areas that would be willing to participate in the
Gautreaux Program.'35 It holds information sessions for prospective landlords to try to break debilitating stereotypes. 3 6 The
Leadership Council also selects Gautreaux Program participants.137 Once a year, it holds a phone lottery, and members of
the Gautreaux class call with the hope of being among the first
2,000 to reach the Leadership Council.'38 The Leadership Council then invites these 2,000 callers to briefing sessions which explain the Gautreaux Program'39 and screens those ,who attend
the briefing by verifying income levels, visiting the applicants'

132. Id. at 558; see also Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 612-613.
133. LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FOR METROPOLITAN OPEN COMMUNITIES, GUIDE TO
PRACTICE OPEN HOUSING LAW 1-2 (1974); Polikoff, supra note 31, at 452.
134. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 675.
135. Letter of Understanding, supra note 99 (The Leadership Council is to "locate owners of housing willing to participate in the demonstration program"); see
also HUD REPORT, supra note 104; Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 645-48.
136. Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 647, 664.
137. HUD REPORT, supra note 104, at 34.
138. CNN NEWS, Low Income Chicagoans Get New Life in 'Burbs (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 6, 1993); Jason DeParle, An UndergroundRailroad from Projects to the Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1993, at Al ("The leadership council registers the first 2,000 families who call and provides the subsidies ... to about 400
new recipients a year."); Barbara B. Buchholz, The Call of a Better Life Gives CHA
Residents Hope, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 1993, at Cl; Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at
622-23.
139. Interview with former director of the Gautreaux Demonstration Program, in
Washington, D.C. (July, 1993) [hereinafter Gautreaux Demonstration Program
Director Interview].
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current homes, performing credit and criminal checks, and obtaining reference letters.140 The Leadership Council also superimposes some objective criteria, such as family size and accessibility to
transportation, on its screening decisions.4 Once the participants are selected, the Leadership Council serves as counselor,
assisting participants with their housing search, accompanying
them to meet landlords and sign leases, making follow-up calls,
providing counseling to ease the transition from the city to the
suburbs, and mediating some landlord/tenant disputes.'
The
Leadership Council clearly serves as much more than a mere
implementor.
As the liaison between HUD, the private market suppliers,
and the prospective tenants, the Leadership Council melded the
Gautreaux Program into a coherent and thriving whole. To assure
supply of 7,100 viable dwelling units, the Leadership Council
meets with potential landlords, hoping to conquer negative preconceptions of low-income housing residents. Screening prospective tenants bolsters this goal, for if the "less desirable" lowincome residents are removed from the pool, landlords will be less
tentative about renting to individuals bearing Section 8 certificates. On the demand side, the relocation of 7,100 families in
foreign neighborhoods presupposes willing participants. By providing counseling before, during, and after the move, the Leadership
Council eases an otherwise dislocating transition. Positive experiences pass by word of mouth to potential participants, generating
further demand. By acclimating Gautreaux class members to their
new environs, the Leadership Council mitigates participants'
defensive hostility, provides landlords with more pleasant and
receptive tenants, and further allays landlords' debilitating perceptions.
In synergistically linking all aspects of the program, the
Leadership Council became a primary recipient of the
policymaking power redistributed to HUD during the course of
Gautreaux. First, the Leadership Council effectively collapsed
many policy and implementation decisions into a single function,
assuming much of the policymaking power HUD would otherwise
possess. The crucial policy questions was: will the government
subsidize public housing? Although the consent decree expressed
the parties' intent to subsidize 7,100 Gautreaux families,' the

140. Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 663; see also HUD REPORT, supra note 104, at
35-37 (describing the application process).
141. Guy Gugliotta, Lottery Offers Chicago's Black Welfare Families a Ticket out
of Town, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1993, at A13 [hereinafter Lottery Offers a Ticket

Out]; see also HUD REPORT, supra note 104, at 37.
142. Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 643-44.
143. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. at 669.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 28:57

various Leadership Council initiatives enabled the preceding question to be answered affirmatively. Without counseling and screening services, the Leadership Council's unique and irreplaceable
contribution to this Section 8 variant, the viability of the entire
program could have been problematic. Second, in recognizing the
need for a centralized entity to coordinate policy, financial, and
implementing decisions, the Leadership Council identified another
important function and, therefore, source of power. By assuming
this coordination role, mainly by providing counseling services to
market suppliers and program participants, the Leadership Council sustained the entire Gautreaux Program and prevented any
one component from faltering.
Chicago's broader public housing context magnifies the Leadership Council's power. The Gautreaux Program, while not the
only source of public housing in Chicago, is the only viable alternative to the notoriously segregated Chicago housing projects
"condemned" as unconstitutional almost twenty-five years ago.
While the CHA remedy, the scattered-site program,"' remains
theoretically in effect, the CHA has actually provided less than
1,000 dwelling units since 1969. " 5 And the CHA is now operating in receivership. "' Members of the plaintiff class will need to
wait longer for the scattered-site housing promised decades ago.
Furthermore, to receive a non-Gautreaux Section 8 certificate or
voucher, an applicant must spend at least 25 years on a waiting
list. "7 As the ex-Director of the Gautreaux Program put it: "Gautreaux is the only game in the town.""'
It is unclear whether HUD, in accepting the Leadership

144. For a discussion of the historical development of scattered-site housing see
supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
145. Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 597; Polikoff, supra note 31, at 452, 459-60.
146. Frustrated with the slow pace of the scattered-site program, the plaintiff
class asked the judge to impose a receiver on the CHA's scattered-site program.
Plaintiffs' request failed twice. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 498 F. Supp. 1072, 1075

(N.D. Ill. 1980); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., CA No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. Ill.
filed Jan. 13, 1984); see also supra note 103 and accompanying text. Under the
administration of Mayor Harold Washington, the CHA embraced the scattered-site
program, but the CHA's inept administration placed it on the brink of bankruptcy.
The CHA was forced to return to court for permission to suspend the scattered-site
program. At that time, the judge placed the agency in receivership. Gautreaux v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., CA No. 66 C1459 (N.D. Ill. filed May 13, 1987). It is only in
the past year that members of the Gautreaux class have begun to see the fruits of
this receivership. The Habitat Company of Chicago, the appointed receiver, has, at
a fledgling pace, begun to implement the scattered-site program. Blair Kamin,
Home Truths: Exploring Some Recent Successes in Public Housing, CHI. TRIB., May
30, 1993, Arts, at 10.
147. Gautreaux Demonstration Program Director Interview, supra note 139. At
times, the waiting lists have been so long that the CHA stopped accepting applications. Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 642.
148. Gautreaux Demonstration Program Director Interview, supra note 139.
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Council's integral role in the remedy, knew that it would be abdicating much of the power redistributed in its favor. It is also unclear whether the Leadership Council deliberately amassed this
power. Nonetheless, the Leadership Council's preeminence is indisputable. As the fuel that makes the one, active public housing
program function, the Leadership Council wields an inordinate
amount of power.
The Gautreaux remedy reshuffled institutions, ultimately
creating a new institutional status quo dominated by the Leadership Council. The following chart records the uprooting, reshuffling, and recongealing of the institutional status quo governing
public housing.
NEW INSTITUTIONAL STATUS QUO
LOCATION OF POWER
Type of
Power

Pre-Gautreaux
(Pre-1966)

CHA Remedy
(1972-1976)

HUD Remedy
(1981-present)

Policy

City Council

CHA

Leadership

CHA

Council
Market
HUD

Financing

HUD

HUD

HUD

Implementation

CHA

CHA

Leadership
Council
Market

Coordination

----

----

Leadership

Council
The Gautreaux remedial saga accentuates the inter-institutional import of the structural injunction. Whereas the balance of
power rested decisively with the CHA and the City Council prior
to the litigation, the Leadership Council became the power broker
in the wake of Gautreaux. Gautreaux also highlights that the
structural injunction is not a remedial moment but rather a prolonged remedial process during which institutions vie for power in
the new institutional status quo.
III. RECONFRONTING THE CRITICS

The Gautreaux structural injunction is a remedial process
composed of a series of redistributive acts. By refocusing the legitimacy and efficacy critiques to better comport with the struc-
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tural injunction's related inter-institutional and temporal dimensions, these critiques are disarmed.
A. The Legitimacy Critique
The Gautreaux story illustrates that: 1) the judiciary retained
very little, if any, usurped power; and 2) once the power was redistributed, the Leadership Council emerged as the most powerful
actor in the new institutional status quo. The first conclusion
neutralizes many separation-of-powers concerns, while the second
mitigates the countermajoritarian difficulty.
1. Separation of Powers
Retelling Gautreaux in terms of redistributive acts allays
concerns regarding judicial forays into the legislative or executive
branch's domain. In redressing the separation-of-powers critique,
one must analytically disentangle the ways in which a judge can
trespass on another branch's domain: 1) in usurping power that
belongs to the legislative or executive branches; 2) in redistributing such power from one institution to another; and 3) in dislodging the institutional status quo and catalyzing the entire redistributive process.
a. Judicial Retention of Power
From a separation-of-powers perspective, certain isolated
judicial acts appear suspect. The judiciary, for example, suspended operation of the Illinois law requiring legislative approval for
CHA housing project proposals, "9 prescribed additional regulatory standards for the functioning of federal programs, 5 ° and created an on-going, supervisory relationship with HUD."' Any of
these actions, viewed as an isolated remedial moment, raises
separation-of-powers concerns.
Asking whether the judge illegitimately usurped legislative
and/or executive power is a premature and narrow inquiry. The
more appropriate inquiry is: What did the judge do with the
usurped power? Gautreaux illustrates that the judiciary retained
very little, if any, power because, as soon as the judge usurped
power, he redistributed it to other institutions. When the judge
took power away from the City Council, he quickly redistributed
this power to the CHA. And when the judge took power from the

149. For a discussion of this decision, see supra notes 75-77 and accompanying

text.
150. For discussion of constraints imposed on the scattered-site program and the
Section 8 Gautreaux Program, see respectively supra notes 67-72 and 106-14.
151. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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CHA, he redistributed the power to HUD. The Leadership Council, in turn, accumulated much of the power redistributed to HUD.
The judge did not retain power, ostensibly obviating concern regarding substantive encroachment upon the power granted to
other branches of government. When the critique's time-frame and
perspective are broadened to encompass the entire redistributive
process, the Gautreaux judges, using the metaphor embraced by
Horowitz, better approximate umpires than empires.'52
b. Judicial Redistribution of Power
But it is not just in judicial retention of power that the judge
can implicate separation of powers. Judicially supervised manipulation of power also heightens separation-of-powers concerns. Did
the judge violate separation of powers in 1) redistributing policymaking power from the Chicago City Council to the CHA? and 2)
shifting the balance of power from the CHA to HUD? 5 ' Part II
of this Article traced the judicial decisions that effected the interinstitutional redistributions. In this section, each of these decisions will be subjected to separation-of-powers scrutiny on the
theory that the entire redistributive process withstands scrutiny if
individual redistributive decisions survive scrutiny.
The court effected a redistribution of power from the City
Council to the CHA by eliminating the City Council's legislative
check on CHA housing project proposals.'
This legislative
check, in reality, functioned as a de jure and de facto veto. While
judicial usurpation of legislative prerogative to make and terminate laws is suspect, 5 this is a rather static, narrow way to describe the judge's actions here. The City Council had, in effect,
self-abrogated the statute. Even though the judge ordered the
CHA to submit sites to the City Council 5 ' and bound the mem-

152. See generally Horowitz, Umpire or Empire?, supra note 7.
153. The redistribution of power in favor of the Leadership Council will not be
examined in this section. This redistributive act does not raise the same type of
separation of powers concerns because the parties, through negotiation of the consent decree, rather than the judiciary, abdicated power to this private organization.
This abdication was sanctioned by federal statute. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
154. 310 ILCS 10/9 (1992). See also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text for
discussion of judicial abrogation of the Illinois statute.
155. If a statute is facially unconstitutional, the judiciary has the power, and the
duty, to abrogate the law. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803). While the Illinois statute was not facially unconstitutional, the way in
which the law was implemented, or circumvented, effected unconstitutional outcomes. The Supreme Court has held that the federal judiciary can abrogate state
laws that obstruct remedial attempts to correct constitutional wrongs. See infra
notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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bers of the City Council to the order,'57 the City Council effectively abdicated its legislative mandate by avoiding a vote.'
The judge merely redistributed this abdicated policymaking power
to the CHA and the public to effect ends for which the Illinois
statute was originally designed: to ensure a public check on the
CHA's efforts to carry out the government's mandate to supply
housing.' If Judge Austin had not taken such redistributive action, the City Council's dormancy would have effectively frustrated other legislative mandates, namely constructing housing in
accordance with the Housing Act of 1937.
In fact, recent Supreme Court doctrine further alleviates
suspicion surrounding the district court's abrogation of the
statute. In Missouri v. Jenkins, although the Supreme Court disavowed a district court remedial order effecting tax increases as
an overly intrusive means to effect public school integration, the
Supreme Court did state that if the judge had merely enjoined the
operation of the state laws which prevented compliance with court
orders, the remedy would have been a legitimate use of federal
equity powers.' Furthermore, in Spallone v. United States, the
Supreme Court implicitly held that circumventing local legislatures' obstructionist tactics falls within the federal courts' remedial power. 6 ' The redistribution of power from the City Council to
the CHA, engineered by the abrogation of a state statute, is immune from separation-of-powers concerns.
As a primary consequence of two substantive decisions, the
judiciary redistributed much of the CHA's power to HUD: 1) the
decision to broaden the scope of the remedy to encompass the
entire Chicago metropolitan area; and 2) the decision to utilize
market-based, Section 8 certificates as a means to integration.
Each of these decisions is free from separation-of-power concerns.
In sanctioning a metropolitan-wide remedy, the courts shifted
power from the CHA to HUD. In Gautreaux, the Supreme Court
interpreted its decision in Milliken, which rejected a metropolitanwide remedy, as hinging on separation-of-powers principles: "[Tihe
District Court's proposed remedy in Milliken was impermissible
because of the limits on the federal judicial power to interfere
with the operation of state political entities that were not implicated in unconstitutional conduct."' Nonetheless, the Court en-

157. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
160. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990).
161. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 267 (1990) (holding that a judge
can hold a city council in contempt of a court order for refusing to vote in a prescribed manner); see also Grossenmacher, supra note 23, at 2243.
162. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 298 (1976).
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dorsed a metropolitan-wide remedy in Gautreaux, implicitly signalling that the Gautreaux remedy was clear of separation-ofpowers concerns. Cognizant of the boundaries of judicial power,
the Gautreaux Court concluded that a metropolitan-wide remedy
fell within this boundary, thereby immunizing the decision from
subsequent separation-of-powers attacks.
The use of Section 8 subsidization policies rather than traditional supply techniques was not a policy innovation. Passed during the course of Gautreaux, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 made explicit provision for Section 8 programs. " In fact, rather than frustrating political processes, the
consent decree forced the utilization of the legislature's Section 8
initiatives, likely enhancing their standing as an alternative approach to public housing. While the courts did modify the Section
8 program, for example by requiring that relocation take place in
General Housing Areas, these types of regulations are not commonly cited among the most egregious separation-of-powers abuses." The Gautreaux Program did not require burdensome expenditures, as was the case with the remedy rejected by the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Jenkins; nor did the remedy require
appointment of administrative personnel. Furthermore, the parties, rather than the judiciary, crafted the remedy. Judge Crowley,
who had replaced Judge Austin, merely approved the consent
decree." 5 The executive branch, which encompasses HUD, is
charged with implementing legislative prerogative. In furthering
implementation of constitutionally sound Section 8 programs,
HUD was respecting, rather than violating, separation-of-powers
principles.
c. Judicial Disruption of the Status Quo
There is a third, somewhat incorrigible, aspect of the separation-of-powers critique. In catalyzing the redistributive process,
even if only by initially dislodging the institutional status quo, the
judiciary violates separation of powers.
On an intuitive level, however, the courts participate in redistributive processes every time they adjudicate a claim and
allocate rights. Rights are proxies, albeit imperfect ones, for power. To categorically exclude the courts from redistributive processes in the name of separation of powers is to ignore the very essence of adjudication.
Furthermore, disrupting the institutional status quo in Gau-

163. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Priv. L. No. 93-383, 88
Stat. 633 (1974).
164. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
165. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 672 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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treaux was an unintended consequence of judicial efforts to redress a constitutional wrong. While separation of powers clearly
can be offended by unintended judicial action, the constitutional
necessity of this particular dislocation allays concern. Once the
institutional status quo is upset, even if unintentionally, the reconfiguration process assumes a life of its own. Therefore, the type
of judicial interference necessary to stop or reverse the redistributive process may be more intrusive than efforts to help forge a
new institutional status quo that better comports with constitutional demands. As long as subsequent judicial manipulation of
power respects separation-of-powers principles, as was the case in
Gautreaux, the judiciary's actions withstand scrutiny.
Finally, even the most avid critics of the structural injunction
do not frame their objections in absolutist terms.' These critics
demand due deference to the legislative and executive branches
and would reserve intrusiveness for remedies of last resort.' In
Gautreaux, Judge Austin clearly evinced a willingness to defer to
the CHA and the City Council. For example, while Judge Austin
found the CHA's practices unconstitutional in 1969,16

he did not

terminate the legislative veto until 1972."' Three years was
ample time to plan, if not build, the type of scattered-site, integrated housing that the court deemed commensurate with constitutional obligations. Yet, in the three year respite Judge Austin
provided, the City Council approved only 20% of the mere 275
sites begrudgingly submitted. 70 The institutional status quo, as
it functioned in 1972, was an impenetrable obstacle to the provision of integrated housing.
Viewing the structural injunction as a prolonged, inter-institutional redistributive process alleviates many separation-of-powers concerns. The judiciary did not retain usurped power, obviating criticism based on substantive encroachment upon other branches' terrain. In redistributing power, the judiciary's actions also
withstand scrutiny, for the individual decisions instigating redistribution did not raise separation of power concerns. While the
judge's role in catalyzing redistributive processes is more difficult
to reconcile with separation of powers, several countervailing
considerations serve, at least, to dull the critique.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
SCHUCK, supra note 18, at 189; Nagel, supra note 14, at 719.
Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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2. CountermajoritarianConcerns
The countermajoritarian critics question the legitimacy of the
structural injunction in the name of democracy: 1) in usurping
legislative prerogative and in legislating via judicial decree, the
judiciary skirts majoritarian policymaking; and 2) structural injunctions produce anti-democratic outcomes. The first argument is
a specific genre of the separation-of-powers critique discussed
above: in assuming a legislative posture without subjecting policies to legislative processes, the judiciary acts in an anti-democratic manner. However, in re-examining the judiciary's actions as
non-isolated components of an ongoing redistributive process, the
base-line claim that the judiciary usurped legislative prerogative
becomes quite problematic. The countermajoritarian critique,
therefore, reduces to the contention that these outcomes are antidemocratic because they disempower local government, diminish
responsiveness
to local demands, and weaken individual auton71
omy.1

The countermajoritarian inquiry, just like the separation-ofpowers inquiry, must accurately reflect the underlying structural
injunction. Asking whether particular remedial moments are antidemocratic discounts the temporal and inter-institutional dynamism of the remedy. The countermajoritarian critic must be cognizant of the entire redistributive process, and, therefore, must ask
where power ultimately rests. The Gautreaux structural injunction created a new institutional status quo which ultimately empowered the Leadership Council, along with the market and HUD.
Upon each of the countermajoritarian critic's axes-locale of decision-making, responsiveness to constituents, and individual empowerment-the new institutional status quo is just as, if not
more, democratic than its pre-Gautreauxcounterpart.
Pre-Gautreaux, the CHA and City Council controlled policy
decisions. Post-Gautreaux, the Leadership Council, the market,
and HUD share policy decisions. In its role as policymaker, HUD
merely determines, on a yearly basis, how many Section 8 certificates will be available for members of the Gautreaux class.
Although nominally a member of the policymaking team, HUD's
real role remains that of financier. Because the Leadership Council assumed much of HUD's delegated power, HUD's pre- and
post-Gautreaux roles are similar. In making the comparisons the
countermajoritarian critique demands, HUD is a constant rather
than a variable and, therefore, drops from the analysis.
The Leadership Council emerged as the dominant member of
the new institutional status quo. While policy decisions that were

171. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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once made at City Hall are now made in a private office on the
south side of Chicago, they remain local decisions nonetheless.
Likewise, the market's policy input, deciding what type of housing
should be provided and where, is a particularized reflection of the
Chicago metropolitan area housing market. The locale of policy
decisions continue to be made at the local level.
What has changed, however, is the policymakers' responsiveness to the needs of their constituents, and the current arrangement appears exceptionally more democratic. While the CHA-City
Council duo ostensibly epitomized locally responsive policymaking,
Chicago-style "democracy," in practice, suffered from severe defects due to institutional corruption and racism.17 The "preclearance procedure," whereby the CHA would not submit housing
proposals to the City Council for a vote without informal approval
from the individual aldermen in white districts,"'3 belies most
notions of responsive policymaking.
Although the Leadership Council is not explicitly accountable
to the people through legislative processes, it is much more responsive. The Leadership Council designed the Gautreaux Program to redress the Gautreaux class' complaints, and continues to
implement the Program so as to mitigate its dislocating and disruptive impact on Gautreaux participants. In other words, the
Leadership Council is functionally responsive to its constituents in
a way that the CHA and City Council never were. What accounts
for this discrepancy? Ostensibly, the Leadership Council is apolitical while the City Council is political. Yet, the Leadership
Council is an organization with a history of liberal political activism, rooted in Dr. Martin Luther King's civil rights movement.
While it may not be political in the purely legislative sense, the
Leadership Council clearly has a political agenda. The more nuanced explanation is that the Leadership Council's constituency,
black, low-income Chicago public housing residents, matches its
rather focused political agenda, to guarantee racially integrated
housing. The City Council, on the other hand, carried many political agendas and had to placate a number of constituent groups.
In balancing multiple demands against political clout, the City
Council. inevitably sacrificed the desires of some groups, most
often the financially impotent. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the Leadership Council is more responsive to the Gautreaux class'
needs.

172. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, Remedying the Irremediable:The Lessons of

Gautreaux, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 573 (1988). The similarily between the title of
this Article and Professor Tarlock's article emphasizes that we both glean generalizable conclusions from the experience of Gautreaux. However, we greatly differ
regarding the substance of these conclusions.
173. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
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But the Gautreaux remedy also empowers the market. The
debate regarding the market's ability to respond to low-income
housing needs has raged since the inception of Section 8 housing
programs. 17 4 Many critics believe that market-based housing initiatives are highly unresponsive, subjecting the poor to the harsh
inequalities of the market. But we need not engage these debates
here because the Gautreaux Program does not place an impoverished individual at the unconstrained mercy of the market. Instead, the Leadership Council orients Gautreaux participants to
market realities, cushioning the harsh confrontation between

market and low-income individual. In seeking and generating
market responsiveness, the Leadership Council alleviates many
concerns that an unconstrained market may raise.
This potent policymaking combination of constrained market
and local public-interest organization has empowered the individual, creating choice-choice where to live, choice whether to live
in integrated housing, and choice whether to traverse the market
or remain in government supplied housing. The following are a
few of the reported reactions to the Gautreaux Program. "I would
never move back to Chicago," said Ms. Evans, who is studying at
a community college to become a nurse; "I plan, when I finish
school, to buy me a house. And it'll be out there.""' "I feel happy, I feel proud of myself. If I could do this, then I am quite sure I
can do other things, too."17 And the Leadership Council ap-

174. There are those who argue that the housing market, per se, is an imperfect
market. See, e.g., Henry J. Aaron, Rationale for a Housing Policy, in FEDERAL
HOUSING POLICY & PROGRAMS, (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985); Chester Hartman,
Housing Allowances: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come, in FEDERAL HOUSING
POLICY & PROGRAMS 383-89 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985). When demand is stimulated, as it may be through the use of some type of market-oriented housing allowance, the nature of the housing market does not allow for quick supplier response.
Therefore, a housing subsidy program that increased demand without effecting
great increases in supply would merely lead to an increase in the cost of housing
and, in reality, negate the effect of the housing allowance. But see I. LOWRY, EXPERIMENTING WITH HOUSING ALLOWANCES (1982) (confirming that the provision of
housing allowances did not inflate the price of housing in either Green Bay or
South Bend).
On the other hand, there are those who argue that the housing problem is the
result of skewed income distribution, not a flawed market, suggesting that direct
income transfers would stimulate the private market to increase supply and improve quality of housing. See Elizabeth A. Roistacher, A Modest Proposal:Housing
Vouchers as Refundable Tax Credits, in HOUSING AMERICA'S POOR 162-74 (Peter D.

Salins ed., (1987); John C. Weicher, Private Production:Has the Rising Tide Lifted
All Boats?, in HOUSING AMERICA'S POOR 45-66 (Peter D. Salins ed., 1987). Proponents of indirect government subsidization not only argue that the market can and
does function, even in the housing realm, but also argue that the state is lacking in
its ability to effect efficient construction.
175. DeParle, supra note 138, at Al.
176. World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 4,
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proaches its responsibilities so as to maximize this sense of individual empowerment. "The Leadership Council intentionally
doesn't present prospective tenants with a new home ....

The

thinking is that participants are happier if they've had full control
over the process and the final selection." 77
Focusing on the ultimate configuration of power embodied in
the new institutional status quo allays the countermajoritarian's
concerns. While policy decisions remain local decisions, the Leadership Council better responds to low income housing residents'
needs, and the individual Gautreaux participant regains some
autonomy. Far from being anti-democratic, the new institutional
status quo, with the Leadership Council at the helm, better approximates the local, grass-roots ideals the countermajoritarian
critics associate with democracy.
Those questioning the structural injunction's legitimacy hastily labeled particular remedial moments illegitimate without
broadening their frame of reference to encompass the rich interinstitutional dynamic. By recasting the separation-of-powers and
countermajoritarian inquiries to account for the related temporal
and inter-institutional dimensions, the Gautreaux structural injunction becomes a legitimate exercise of judicial power.
B. Revisiting Efficacy

Efficacy critics generally ask: Did the judge successfully effectuate the remedy chosen to rectify the constitutional violation?
Usually the critics answer this question negatively, noting particular blunders occurring during the course of a structural injunction, including cumbersome delays and blatant institutional defiance of court orders. The Gautreaux structural injunction has not
escaped this type of criticism. Professor Tarlock, for example,
writes, that "the Gautreaux litigation is a classic example of the
inability of the judiciary to remedy effectively racial discrimination." 78 Tarlock further argues that the effectiveness of the Gautreaux remedy was constrained by political resistance-the image
that public housing had conjured was so unpalpable that the CHA
met impenetrable resistance in implementing the scattered-site
program.'79 Professor Peter Shane also highlights the delay between the original court order and the development of new, scattered-site housing as proof of the structural injunction's ineffectiveness and the judge's inability to appreciate Chicago's political
dynamics.' 0 Likewise, Professor Linda Hirshman criticizes the
1993).
177.
178.
179.
180.

Buchholz, supra note 138, at Real Estate 1.
Tarlock, supra note 172, at 576.
Id. at 578.
Peter Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531,
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remedy's effectiveness, pointing to the meager number of dwelling
8
units constructed in the wake of Gautreaux."
'
These criticisms may have been well-founded in 1974, or even
in 1988 when they were made, but today they are outdated. Efficacy critics uniformly made their assessments too early, extrapolating from a static snapshot of the relationship between the judge
and the CHA an overall conclusion that the Gautreaux structural
injunction was ineffective. In discounting the structural injunction's temporal dimension, the critics unfairly skew efficacy assessments.
1. The Gautreaux Program:A Policy Success
A re-examination of efficacy, factoring the entire remedial
process into the assessment, produces an aura of success rather
than failure. While the success of housing mobility strategies is a
matter of debate, the results of Gautreaux are clearly not as glum
as the critics depicted. Nearly 5,300 families have taken advantage of the Gautreaux Program to relocate in predominantly white
Chicago suburbs,'82 and HUD officials estimate that they will
meet the 7,100 requirement soon.8 3 More revealing than the total number of families served by the Gautreaux Program is the increasing demand for coveted Gautreaux certificates. For example,
when the Leadership Council conducted its 1993 annual phonathon through which it makes available the Section 8 housing
certificates, 15,000 people called, 2,000 people actually reached
the Leadership Council, and 250 Section 8 certificates were available for distribution."l s This phone lottery is so popular that
some participants "often travel to suburbs simply to call, since the
circuits jam in parts of the city where public housing is
dense."'85
The high local demand likely reflects the perceived social and
economic advantages linked to participation in the Gautreaux
Program. Professor James Rosenbaum, in several studies of Gautreaux participants, documents the benefits those participants who
relocate in the suburbs enjoy.' Adults, who are primarily single

568 (1988).
181. Linda R. Hirshman, Foreword: Kicking over the Traces of Self.Government,
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 435, 437 (1988). Other analyses criticize Gautreaux for the
virtual freeze in the construction of low-income housing in Chicago. See also The
Gautreaux Decision and its Effect on Subsidized Housing Before the Subcomm. on
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 22, 1978).
182. CNN NEWS, Low Income Chicagoans Get New Life in 'Burbs (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 6, 1993).
183. Burtschi Interview, supra note 114.
184. Buchholz, supra note 138, at Cl.
185. DeParle, supra note 138, at Al.
186. See James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, Employment and Earnings of
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mothers,18 7 are able to find work more easily in the suburbs not
only because there are more jobs"s but also because the safer
environment allows them to work relatively free from worry about
the safety of their children."i 9 Furthermore, Gautreaux children
raised in the suburbs are over five times more likely to go to college than their city counterparts, 9 ° and the high school graduation rate of those who enroll is ninety-five percent. 9' Those Gautreaux children not in school are almost twice as likely as their
inner-city counterparts to find employment and four times as
likely to be earning over $6.50 per hour.9 2
The Gautreaux Program is nationally lauded as a program
that works. Touted as "a modest version of the Underground Railroad," the Gautreaux Program "is one of the few answers [to inner-city poverty and violence] that has passed a field test."'93 In
American Apartheid, a recent study of how urban policies have
perpetuated the segregated ghetto, the Gautreaux Program is
praised as a policy that promises to rectify the related economic
and racial problems inflicting inner-city America.'
In fact,
HUD is currently using the Gautreaux Program as the model
upon which its national "Moving to Opportunity" program will be
based.'95

Low Income Blacks who Move to Middle Class Suburbs, in THE URBAN
UNDERCLASS 342 (Jencks & Peterson eds., 1991) [hereinafter Employment and
Earnings]; James E. Rosenbaum, et al., Social Integration of Low-Income Black
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Social Integration];James E. Rosenbaum, et al., White Suburban Schools' Responses to Low Income Black Children: Sources of Success and Problems, URB. REV.,
Spring 1988, at 28.
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moved to the suburbs were headed by single mothers. HUD REPORT, supra note
104. This percentage remained relatively constant over the subsequent decade.
188. Employment and Earnings,supra note 186, at 343-44
189. See Buchholz, supra note 138, at Cl; Michael Abramowitz, High Rises to
Hell: Why Fix Up Ghastly Projects Like Cabrini Green? Let's Gut Them Out, WASH.
POST, Nov. 22, 1992, at C5.
190. See World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC television broadcast,
Feb. 4, 1993).
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192. DeParle, supra note 138, at Al.
193. Id.
194. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 231 (1993).

195. Moving to Opportunity is one of four pilot programs that HUD hopes to
initiate this fiscal year. Guy Gugliotta, Shallow Pockets and Big Needs Prod
'Small' Thinking at HUD, WASH. POST, July 13, 1993, at A6 [hereinafter Shallow
Pockets]. The federal government plans to allocate $234 million, over the next year,
to help over 6,000 poor families move to middle class areas in five different cities.
DeParle, supra note 138, at Al. While Moving to Opportunity is modeled after the
Gautreaux Program, the federal program focuses on economic, rather than racial,
integration. Gugliotta, Shallow Pockets, supra, at A6. See generally Alter, supra
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As a substantive remedy, the parties, institutions, and judges
evinced a high degree of foresight and understanding of the problems afflicting inner-city America. Despite the documented legal,
economic, and social advances toward racial equality, the Gautreaux Program is not an uncontroverted success. While a fullfledged weighing of the costs and benefits of housing mobility
strategies is beyond the scope of this Article, some criticisms of
the Gautreaux Program deserve mention here.
Some claim that this type of housing mobility subjects those
trying to escape one evil, segregation, to another related evil,
discrimination. 96 While acknowledging that suburban participants encounter more discrimination and harassment than their
inner-city counterparts, 7 Rosenbaum argues that, after the first
year, discrimination in the suburbs is not significantly more prevalent than that confronted in intra-city integrative efforts. 98
Children who moved to the suburbs had as many friends as those
who remained in the city,9 and Gautreaux participants "did not
encounter the kind of white hostility commonly experienced by
project inhabitants." 0 Furthermore, the Leadership Council's
commitment to educating and counseling participating landlords,
as well as its stringent pre-screening efforts, alleviates overt discrimination. While it is indisputable that Gautreaux participants
have reported incidents of discrimination, institutionalized buffers
apparently mitigate such discrimination.
Although the Gautreaux Program will meet its 7,100 target
with little difficulty, others note that demand for Gautreaux certificates far outweighs the supply of certificates and housing in General and Revitalizing Housing Areas that meets the Section 8 requirements. Rubinowitz, for example, argues that because land-
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lords are under no obligation to rent to recipients of Section 8
vouchers, many landlords reject Gautreaux participants. Rubinowitz attributes much of this reticence to entrenched racism.2 '°
Furthermore, the stringent proscription against relocating in
Limited Housing Areas restricts the Leadership Council's ability
to find eligible dwelling units in many of Chicago's suburban
areas. 202
In many ways, the preceding criticism highlights the policy's
successes. If the public did not perceive the Gautreaux Program
as the preferable housing alternative, then demand would not be
so high. But does the nature of the Gautreaux Program inherently
limit its remedial scope? While discrimination threatens to circumscribe the Program's viability, the Leadership Council's coaxing approach promises to topple some discriminatory barriers to
increasing supply. Other limiting factors, such as the requirement
that the Gautreaux certificates be redeemable only in General or
Revitalizing areas, could be modified to stimulate supply. While
the Gautreaux Program will never be the panacea to all of Chicago's housing problems, or even all of its housing discrimination
problems, there is no apparent institutional reason why the program could not be extended beyond the 7,100 target. But even if
the impediments to increasing the Program's size could not be
overcome, critiques based on scope do not squarely undermine the
policy successes.
Many question why the victims of a segregated housing system should bear the remedial burden. °3 The success of the
remedy clearly hinges on the Gautreaux class' willingness to uproot themselves and to move to the suburbs. And in that sense,
the cost of integration is carried by the victims of segregation. The
structure of the remedy, however, mitigates this criticism. From
accompanying Gautreaux participants as they meet prospective
landlords to conducting follow-up counseling, the Leadership
Council minimizes the disruptiveness of the move.
Probably the most damning critique of the Gautreaux Program is its discounting of minority, in this case black, communitarian values. It is paradoxical that the solution to decades of
majoritarian oppression is a dispersal of the black community.
However, the original goal of the case, integration, implied a certain diminution in the integrity of minority communities. While
the cohesiveness of the black community is further diminished
when the suburbs are included in the remedy, any remedy that
the court could have fashioned in response to this particular com-

201. Rubinowitz, supra note 70, at 656.
202. Id. at 651.
203. See, e.g., Richard Gervase, Remedy or Not?: Public Housing Discrimination
and Suburban Exclusion, 12 YALE L. & POLY REV. (forthcoming Spring 1994).
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plaint would have, in some ways, diminished community integrity.
While the success of generic housing mobility strategies is a
matter of controversy, the Gautreaux context allays many concerns. The Leadership Council's agility as coordinator makes it
difficult to label the Gautreaux Program anything but a policy
success.
2. The New InstitutionalStatus Quo: Institutional Success
The way the critics pose efficacy questions reveals a poignant
lack of appreciation for the structural injunction's inter-institutional dimension. As a structural injunction progresses, two simultaneous, but not necessarily independent, processes ensue: 1) the
substantive remedying of a constitutional wrong; and 2) the forging of a new institutional status quo. As traditionally posed, the
efficacy inquiry focuses solely on the imposition of the substantive
remedy, discounting the structural injunction's inter-institutional
function. Notions of "efficacy" or "success" must be unpacked to
reflect this underlying duality. In this Article, "policy success" refers to the substantive results of the Section 8 housing mobility
strategies, and, as discussed above, the Gautreaux structural
injunction is a stunning policy success. A structural injunction
that effectively forges a new institutional status quo is deemed an
"institutional success."
The successful congealing of a new institutional status quo is
not easily discernable. Stability, however, is one indicia. For over
a decade, the Leadership Council, the market, and HUD have
been allocating power as indicated on the preceding chart. 20 4 It
appears as though this distribution of power will remain stable
even as the Gautreaux Program meets its goals, for HUD is desperately trying to maintain this auspicious partnership by finding
a new role for the Leadership Council.2"5 A second indicia is ability to sustain the substantive remedy. As will be discussed in the
following section, this particular panoply of institutions buttressed
the policy success of the Gautreaux Program, effectively sustaining the remedy until reaching its target. That Gautreaux is becoming a nationally generalizable model is a third indicia of institutional success. HUD's "Moving to Opportunity" initiative combines the expertise of local public interest organizations, the flexibility of market-based housing vouchers, and the resources of
HUD to create Gautreaux-like programs throughout the country.
In forging a stable institutional network that effectively sustains the Gautreaux Program, Gautreaux constructed a new institutional status quo. As such, Gautreaux is properly labeled an

204. See Chart: New Institutional Status Quo, supra p. 83.
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institutional, as well as policy, success. Viewing Gautreaux from a
distance, as a multidimensional redistributive process, Gautreaux
is a success story that undermines the traditional efficacy critique
and fundamentally alters the way efficacy questions must be
asked in the future.
3. Relationship Between Institutionaland Policy Success
While notions of success must be parsed to account for the
structural injunction's underlying complexity, one cannot deny the
relationship between policy success and institutional success.
Gautreaux's new institutional status quo did not merely sustain
the Gautreaux Program but actually contributed to the policy's
success. I have already noted how particular institutional changes, such as the Leadership Council's ascension, contributed to the
Gautreaux Program's success. Whereas the CHA and the City
Council were corrupt, inefficient, and obstructionist, the highly
responsive Leadership Council tamed its market partner, furthering the policy's efficacy.
The post-Gautreauxinstitutional status quo also depoliticized
public housing policy without abandoning "grass roots"
policymaking. While removal of the City Council from the network
was probably most significant, disempowering the CHA, notorious
for its unyielding alliance with the City Council,2 6 also furthered depoliticization. Depoliticization permits policymakers'
focus to remain on the substantive issue. With cost/benefit analyses informed by substance rather than by political expedience,
sound and viable policy decisions will more likely ensue.
In addition, the institutional network is significantly more
differentiated than that governing pre-Gautreaux housing policy.
Prior to Gautreaux, specific institutions held monopolies over
various decisions: the CHA controlled implementation decisions,
HUD controlled financing decisions, and the City Council and the
CHA controlled policy decisions. Although the City Council and
CHA may, at first, appear to be a differentiated pair, the CHA
was a mere puppet of the City Council.2"7 Monopoly power reduces accountability and responsiveness to demand. The Gautreaux remedy broke these monopolistic power structures. Neither
the market, the Leadership Council, nor HUD currently enjoys
unbridled policymaking power; each institution mediates the decisions of the others. Likewise, the Leadership Council and the
market negotiate implementation decisions. The dismantling of
such monopolies forces inter-institutional deliberation, explicit or
implicit, which, in turn, engenders more responsive, accountable,
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and rational decisions.
The new institutional status quo also has a coordinator while
the pre-Gautreaux institutional landscape did not. As discussed
above, the Leadership Council serves not only as policymaker and
implementor but also as coordinator, assuring that the policy,
financing and implementation decisions function as a coherent
package. Using hindsight, foresight, and peripheral vision, the
coordinator maximizes the synergies among participating institutions.
In dividing power among a not-for-profit, the market, and a
federal government agency, Gautreaux institutionalized a powerful trio that mitigates some of the inefficiencies of government
programs and inequalities of the market. This institutional network is currently being harnessed by HUD to effect numerous
contours of housing policy. For example, the National Community
Development Initiative is a joint venture of HUD and philanthropic organizations to fund local, non-profit groups in efforts to
further community-based, inner-city development." 8 Likewise,
the Innovative Homeless Fund integrates the resources and expertise of HUD, local officials, nonprofit groups, and private neighborhood groups to combat the growing homelessness problem." 9
Courts also recognize the remedial power of this triad. For example, Hispanic recipients of Section 8 vouchers in Westchester
County, New York, charged HUD and local housing authorities
with discrimination in their steering practices.210 In negotiating
a settlement that mirrors the Gautreaux Program, the defendants
agreed to finance a nonprofit organization modeled after the Leadership Council, the Westchester People's Action Coalition, to distribute Section 8 vouchers. 1'
The preceding discussion suggests how a new institutional
status quo can inform policy success. Conversely, policy success
may impact institutional success. A successful policy satisfies a
requisite condition for institutional success, ability to sustain the
underlying substantive remedy. A successful policy also instills
confidence in the configuration of executing institutions and,
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thereby, enhances the stability of the new institutional status quo.
Furthermore, a successful policy will be sought for replication and
the supporting panoply of institutions may become a generalizable
model. A successful policy fortifies a new institutional status quo.
Despite the strong correlation between policy and institutional success, policy success is not necessarily a perfect or timely
proxy for institutional success. A particular institutional configuration may effectively support the prescribed substantive remedy,
but that remedy may not be deemed a policy success. In such a
scenario, policy failure would not necessarily undermine institutional success. Furthermore, policy success may occur years after
the new institutional status quo congeals. In Gautreaux,for example, the policy successes were not prominent until the early 1990s,
but the new institutional landscape was solidified sometime in the
mid-1980s.
C. Relationship Between Efficacy and Legitimacy

This Article was inspired by an inclination that the Gautreaux Program's nationally recognized policy successes somehow
vindicated the whole judicial enterprise-that somehow the policy
ends legitimated the legal means. It is not merely the success of
the Gautreaux Program that begs this question. The critics of the
structural injunction generally confound efficacy and legitimacy,
subsuming the former into the latter. Horowitz, one of the most
avid legitimacy critics, relies on ex post efficacy arguments to
undermine the structural injunction's legitimacy. Horowitz argues
that "the least bureaucratized branch of government," the judiciary, will ineffectively administer the legislative functions it inappropriately assumes, and, thereby, the structural injunction is
illegitimate." In conflating efficacy and legitimacy, Horowitz
intimates that policy ends may impact the legitimacy of the
means.
Yet an argument directly linking legitimacy to policy success,
carried to its logical conclusion, would delegitimate all judicial
interventions resulting in policy failures. This is not what I am
arguing. This Article dispelled the legitimacy critiques not by
showcasing policy successes but rather by aligning the respective
critiques with the structural injunction's underlying inter-institutional and temporal realities. In fact, the relationship between the
efficacy of the ends and the legitimacy of the means is rather
attenuated. Results only become relevant in as much as they
provide a secure point from which to make retrospective legitimacy assessments, which then proceed along the countermajoritarian
and separation-of-powers axes.
212. Horowitz, Decreeing OrganizationalChange, supra note 15, at 1304.

1994]

The Lessons of Gautreaux

Traditional legitimacy critiques are hasty and myopic, reaching tentative, and frequently incorrect, conclusions. But, when
recast to account for the structural injunction's inter-institutional
and temporal dimensions, the focus of these inquiries inevitably
shifts toward the conclusion of the redistributive process. Separation-of-powers critics must broaden their focus on individual judicial acts to encompass the entire redistributive process. Likewise,
the countermajoritarian critics must scrutinize the identity of the
ultimate power holders to determine whether the remedy produced anti-democratic outcomes. In utilizing the culmination of
the remedial process as their vantage point, legitimacy analyses
inevitably collide with the structural injunction's empirical results. With the results also serving as the point of retrospection,
how, if at all, do these ends inform legitimacy assessments?
Properly recast legitimacy inquiries presuppose the congealing of a new institutional status quo, for it is at this moment that
uprooted institutions come to rest, inter-institutional redistributive processes culminate, and the identity of the ultimate power
holders becomes apparent. When the inter-institutional, redistributive process has stabilized into a configuration capable of sustaining the remedy, the structural injunction is deemed an institutional success. At that point, the critic is assured of a secure
vantage point from which to look back and assess the legitimacy
of remedial efforts in light of separation-of-powers and countermajoritarian concerns. Institutional success, therefore, acts as a
precursor to the entire legitimacy inquiry. While institutional
success lays the foundation for legitimacy analysis, it does not
affect the substantive outcome of the inquiry.
Although legitimacy and institutional success are indirectly
related, it is important to underscore what this conclusion does
not state. First, although institutional success is a precondition
for the legitimacy inquiry, it does not legitimate the remedial
means. Institutional success is no guarantee of legitimacy; it is
only a guarantee of a stable vantage point from which to make
legitimacy judgments. Second, except for its relationship to institutional success, policy success is irrelevant to legitimacy assessments. Although the correlation between institutional and policy
success is very high, this correlation is not perfect. Suppose, for
example, that the Gautreaux Program was an ineffective policylandlords would not participate, members of the Gautreaux class
did not demand the certificates, and the shock of the move hindered low-income residents' ability to make the social adjustment
to suburban life. While the substantive remedy would likely be
labeled a policy failure, it is not clear whether the institutional
dimension would deserve a similar label. As long as the failure is
policy-specific rather than linked to structural deficiencies, policy
failure does not necessarily undermine the stability of the result-
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ing institutional framework. As such, policy failure or success may
be insignificant, even as a mere precursor to the legitimacy inquiry.
While many critics scorned its beginnings, the Gautreaux
story has ended happily. But these endings can be utilized to
resuscitate Gautreaux'sbeginnings only indirectly, by providing a
stable vantage point from which to make unyielding legitimacy
assessments. The successful congealing of a new institutional
status quo demarcates this durable vantage point. While policy
success may bolster institutional success, it is only through this
circuitous avenue that Gautreaux's well-publicized endings can be
used to recover its beginnings.
V. CONCLUSION
The structural injunction is a multidimensional remedial
process. On one plane the judge interacts with a particular institution. On another plane, related institutions interact with each
other. In attempting to redress a constitutional violation in one
implicated institution, the judge frequently disrupts the institutional status quo and effects significant inter-institutional redistributions of power. While critics view the structural injunction
myopically, the Gautreaux case colorfully illustrates this remedy's
inter-institutional and temporal dynamism. As power passed from
the Chicago City Council to the CHA, from the CHA to HUD, and
then from HUD to the private sector, Gautreaux forged a new
institutional status quo.
The legitimacy and efficacy critiques typically launched at
the structural injunction are incommensurate with this remedy's
complexity because the language of assessment is clearly molded
by the very dispute resolution models that the structural injunction rejects. "Legitimacy" has been understood as a snapshot assessment of the propriety of a remedial moment-the judge's resolution of a dispute between two parties. Traditional legitimacy
inquiries inevitably discount the other moments that constitute
the overall remedial process and, thereby, skew the inquiry's outcomes independent of substance. Likewise, notions of "success" or
"efficacy" are incommensurate with the underlying structural
injunction. Conventionally used to appraise for a particular remedial moment, efficacy assessments do not account for the remedy's
dynamism. Furthermore, efficacy has traditionally been synonymous with policy success, belittling the structural injunction's
inter-institutional dimension.
At its very core, therefore, this Article is about recasting
time-honored modes of assessment to conform better with the
underlying object of assessment. It is about asking new questions
to avoid privileging misleading answers. It is about reinvigorating
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beginnings, not by parading happy endings, but by using such
endings as a new entree from which to reexamine beginnings.
These are the enduring lessons of Gautreaux.

